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ARGUMENT 
I. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASE LAW INDICATES THAT 
INSUFFICIENCY-OF-THE-EVIDENCE ISSUES NEED NOT BE 
RAISED OR PRESERVED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT. 
Citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P. 3d 346 and State v. 
Marquez, 2002 UT App. 127, the State contends that " [a] defendant 
must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or 
objection to preserve the issue for appeal." See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 8-9). The State's argument, however, fails to 
consider recent case law from the Utah Supreme Court that is in 
direct contravention to its position. 
In State v. Fedorowicz, 2 002 UT 67, the Utah Supreme Court 
recently considered an insufficiency-of-the evidence argument for 
the first time on appeal. The appellant asserted that an 
insufficiency argument need not be raised or preserved before the 
trial court. See Brief of Appellant, p. 1. The State did not 
argue otherwise. See Brief of Appellee, p. 2. Without reference 
to a rule that might bar consideration, the Utah Supreme Court 
proceeded to consider the insufficiency-of-the-evidence issue. 
See id. at ^[40-44. 
In State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, which was decided prior to 
Fedorowicz, the Utah Supreme Court also addressed an 
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim for the first time on appeal. 
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See id. at ff43-51. Although the Court noted the general rule set 
forth in Holgate, the Court proceeded to consider the argument of 
insufficiency of the evidence for "manifest or prejudicial error." 
See id. at 1(44. 
The foregoing case law demonstrates, at the very least, that 
insufficiency-of-the-evidence issues may be considered for the 
first time on appeal. Consequently, the insufficiency-of-the-
evidence argument is squarely before this Court for due 
consideration.x 
II. THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE LEGITIMATE TACTIC OR 
STRATEGY TO BE SURMISED FROM APPOINTED TRIAL 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST AN INSTRUCTION FOR A 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
The State argues that an instruction for the lesser included 
offense of receiving stolen property "would have been inconsistent 
with counsel's trial strategy." See Brief of Appellee, pp. 13-14. 
However, the record reveals that no conceivable legitimate tactic 
or strategy can be surmised from appointed trial counsel's failure 
to request such an instruction. 
xIn its Brief, the State argues that Mr. Triptow failed to 
marshal various facts in the course of marshaling the evidence. 
See Brief of Appellee, p. 11. The State, however, neglects to 
mention that all of the "important facts" listed in its Brief are 
included within the evidence specifically marshaled by Mr. Triptow in 
his Brief of Appellant. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 16-18. 
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According to Utah case law, "[a]n ineffectiveness claim 
'succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy 
can be surmised from counsel's actions.'" State v. Perry, 899 
P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Tennyson, 
850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Moritzsky, 
111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Consequently, "this 
court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic 
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." 
Id. (quoting Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465 (citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2065 (1984)). 
Not just any conceivable tactic or strategy is sufficient to 
defeat a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, the 
tactic or strategy must be legitimate and well-founded. See id. 
(quoting Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468) (citation omitted). 
In State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), this 
Court addressed a contention that trial counsel was ineffective 
by, among other things, failing to request a jury instruction for 
the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Id. at 1238. 
This Court affirmed the defendant's conviction of aggravated 
kidnaping, concluding that trial counsel's strategy was to claim 
misidentification, or alternatively, to demonstrate that the State 
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had failed to show any aggravation - not that the defendant had 
been involved in a lesser offense. Id. at 1241.2 
In the instant case, appointed trial counsel's argument 
focused almost exclusively on Mr. Triptow's nonparticipation in 
the burglary or theft of the Webb property (See, e.g., R. 148, pp. 
52-54, p. 56, p. 81) . At no time did appointed trial counsel 
present any evidence or substantive explanation for the stolen 
property that had been taken f rom the Webb garage that was 
subsequently found in Mr. Triptow's vehicle. Instead, appointed 
trial counsel chose to underscore the fact that '"other" stolen 
property had been found in Mr. Triptow's vehicle, and that Mr. 
Triptow "knew or should have known, if he didn't know," that the 
other property had been stolen (See R. 14 8, pp. 43-44) .3 
Contrary to the State's argument, the record demonstrates 
that appointed trial counsel did not make a strategic decision not 
to request an instruction on a lesser included offense. For 
example, shortly before resting, appointed trial counsel 
2In Perry, at a hearing before the trial court during which the 
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were 
considered, trial counsel expressly stated that to have requested an 
instruction for the lesser included offense of aggravated assault 
would have been wholly "incompatible" with his strategy. State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
3A copy of appointed trial counsel's opening statement is set 
forth as Addendum A to this Reply Brief of Appellant (See R. 148, pp. 
42-45). 
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stipulated "that the property referred to in Count 2 which [sic] 
an allegation of theft, that that the property was found in the 
van that Michael Triptow was driving . . . ." (See R. 148, p. 79) . 
Appointed trial counsel further stipulated "that the property 
referred to in Count 3 which is the theft by receiving stolen 
property which is also called possession of stolen property, that 
that property was also found in the van that Mr. Triptow was 
driving . . . ." (See id.) . 
An instruction on the lesser included offense of theft by 
receiving stolen property would have been wholly consistent with 
the theory of the case that Mr. Triptow did not participate in the 
burglary or theft of the Webb property. Moreover, an instruction 
on the lesser included offense is a logical extension of that 
theory and would have provided the jury with a legitimate 
alternative for purposes of a conviction. This legitimate 
extension is demonstrated by the prosecutor's factual scenario 
presented during closing argument, explaining how Mr. Triptow knew 
what his "buddy" was doing (See R. 148, pp. 124-25) .4 
4A copy of the prosecutor's factual scenario that explains Mr. 
Triptow's knowledge is set forth in Addendum B to this Reply Brief of 
Appellant (See R. 148, pp. 124-25). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that forth in the 
previously submitted Brief of Appellant, Michael G. Triptow, 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions, and 
that the Court remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with the instructions set forth in its opinion, and for such other 
relief as the Court deems just and appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 2002. 
CD Y WIGGINS, P.C. —^Wig^a^f 
At t o r n e y g r f ^ r Appe l l an t 
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Tab A 
find beyond a reasonable doubt when you use your common sense 
and ask what is reasonable here, what's reasonable inferences 
and explanations, that the evidence is going to show you that 
Mr. Triptow was involved and committed himself or with another 
party as a party, an accomplice, all three of the crimes 
mentioned and charged in the information today. And that in 
good conscious and good faith and being fair, after you hear 
the evidence you will be able to render a guilty of burglary, a 
verdict of guilty on all three counts. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rawlings. 
Mr. Cella? 
MR. CELLA: Thank you, Judge. Most of what Mr. 
Rawlings has said we don't want to dispute. We don't dispute 
that this lady's house in Farmington was burglarized. We don't 
dispute that somebody entered into her garage and took some 
stuff out of her garage. But one of the things that Mr. 
Rawlings didn't really talk about was the fact that there were 
two people there that night. Mrs. Smith will testify today and 
she'll talk about how there were two people that she saw. We 
don't know what this other guy was doing there. Mr. Triptow, 
however, what the evidence will be when talked to this officer 
over here, when he was questioned that night, he said I'm in 
this neighborhood to find a girl I know. We don't know what 
the other guy was doing while this was going on and what he'd 
done before but that would explain Mr. Triptow's presence in 
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the neighborhood that night and that's what he was doing there. 
Like I say, I don't have any information about the other fellow 
and it appears that it probably did burglarize, the other 
fellow probably did burglarize this lady's house because the 
property was found abandoned and Mr. Triptow and this other 
individual (inaudible). So this other individual pretty 
clearly is guilty of burglary. The question is whether or not 
they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Triptow 
committed that burglary. 
It's important to remember that right now Mr. Triptow 
starts off innocent. We don't have to prove anything. We 
don't have to call any witnesses. I don't have to present a 
theory. I don't have to argue anything. I don't have to prove 
who did it. I don't have to prove who didn't do it. The State 
has to prove every element of the burglary charge and the theft 
charge connected to that burglary to you beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I don't have to prove he didn't do it. Because how you 
prove a negative? It's just not going to happen. 
Now, in the van in which Mr. Triptow was driving 
there was this other property which was taken from Bountiful on 
a previous occasion. And Mr. Triptow knew or should have 
known, if he didn't know, he should have known that this 
property was stolen, this other property from the other 
burglary in Bountiful. Like I said, we don't dispute that 
count and that's Count 3 and at the conclusion of the case 
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we'll ask you find Mr. Triptow guilty of Count 3 which is that 
a theft case because we don't dispute that. That was taken 
from a different, a different case and he's not charged with 
the burglary, he's just charged with having in his possession 
property which he knew or should have known was stolen. That's 
all they can charge him with on that Count 3. We don't dispute 
that. He had in his possession property which he knew or 
should have known was stolen. We do dispute the burglary and 
the theft charge connected to the burglary. This other guy 
that Mr. Triptow was with that night, it appears to be he did 
it. That's the person that's guilty of the burglary and not 
Mr. Triptow. 
And, Judge, while we were busy striking, striking 
some of you and sending some of you on yourway, you guys were 
probably all wishing you had said you were all Canadians so you 
could (inaudible). While you were doing that, while we were 
doing that I think the Judge was talking to you about the right 
to a jury trial and how it's not guaranteed in very many 
criminal justice systems in the world and ours is one of the 
view. Our criminal justice system comes from England and 
that's where we got our criminal justice concept from. But 
really in England you didn't have a right to a trial by jury 
until 1215. You heard about Magna Carta and King John had 
(inaudible) and he got caught by the Lords and they said hey, 
we don't want to tried by (inaudible), we want to be tried by 
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people like us. And so, really, since 1215 you've had a right 
to a trial by your peers and you are the peers of Mr. Triptow 
today. 
And one of the other things that was granted 
(inaudible) of 1215 which has been the staple to the criminal 
justice system since then is that you're not guilty unless you 
can proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And they can't 
prove that he committed this burglary and the theft connected 
to that burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cella. 
Mr. Rawlings, you may call your first witness. 
MR. RAWLINGS: Your Honor, we would call Kathy Smith. 
THE COURT: Kathy Smith? Ms. Smith, would you step 
up here, please? If you'll come right up here. Come right 
here if you would, raise your hand and face the clerk and 
she'll place you under oath. 
KATHY SMITH 
having first been duly sworn, testified 
upon her oath as follows: 
THE COURT: If you'll have a seat up here, please, 
and pull that chair right up in front of that microphone. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. RAWLINGS: 
Q Good morning, ma'am. 
A Morning. 
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TabB 
1 about why is Triptow found here and the van is found over here 
2 J and that the other guy does all this unbeknownst to Mr. 
3 Triptow. Well, I would submit to you this, ladies and 
4 gentlemen of the jury, a couple of different theories that 
5 answer that. Number 1, is the time. Mr. Cella, himself, 
6 brought out through Officer Winkelman it could have been as 
7 much as maybe ten minutes from the time of Kathy Smith calls 
8 until it's dispatched, three more minutes until he gets there. 
9 There is plenty of time for Mr. Triptow to have driven the van 
10 around, to have gotten out and walked around to have been 
11 heading back this way. 
12 | But I'd also submit to you this, let's say that Mr. 
13 Cella's theory is correct. Mr. Triptow's walking back around 
14 this way, the other guy steals the stuff, jumps in the van and 
15 brings it this way. How does Triptow know it? If the other 
16 guy does all this, why does Mr. Triptow, how is walking back 
17 this way heading toward the van if he doesn't know what his 
18 buddy is doing? Because he knew. When Officer Winkelman 
19 confronts him the van is right over here, they're right by it. 
20 J You know, they go over to it, they look in the van. Mr. 
21 ! Triptow never says, hey, I don't know how that van got here. I 
22 I parked it down here. Somebody else must have brought that van 
23 J around. He never offers than explanation, ladies and gentlemen 
24 | of the jury because he knew where the van was. So, whether 
25 Triptow drove it there himself and got out and walks over here 
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1 or whether his buddy does it while he comes around this way, he 
2 knew where his buddy was going and he knew the van was going to 
3 be here, that's why he's heading there for a rendevous. Mr. 
4 Triptow never expressed surprise to Officer Winkelman, 
5 according to his testimony, that the van is sitting up here and 
6 he's come in proximity to it. And why? Because he knew it was 
7 there. If he wouldn't have, if their explanation holds water, 
8 he would have expressed to the officer that I parked the van 
9 way down there. I don't know how it got up here. Somebody 
10 else must have stole that stuff and drove my van here because I 
11 parked it way down there. But he never said that because he 
12 knew the van was there either because he drove it himself or 
13 the other guy who only Mr. Triptow knows, who was never 
14 apprehended so unfortunately we couldn't bring him here today 
15 to testify because we don't know who he is - only Triptow does 
16 because he knows what the other guy was up to, too. And I'll 
17 submit to you there is a rationale explanation for why Mr. 
18 Triptow is out there by the van whether he took it around or 
19 the buddy took it around, he knew the rendevous point. 
20 | THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rawlings. 
21 Bailiff, if you'll step forward and be sworn. 
22 (Whereupon the bailiff was sworn.) 
23 THE COURT: Now, ladies and gentlemen, I again will 
24 J send the jury instructions with you. Remember the verdict 
25 forms are at the back of the jury instructions. We'll send you 
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